Recent investigations into cross-country convergence follow Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) in using a log-linear approximation to the Swan-Solow growth model to specify regressions. These studies tend to assume a common and exogenous technology. In contrast, the technology catch-up literature endogenises the growth of technology. The use of capital stock data renders the approximations and over-identification of the Mankiw model unnecessary and enables us, using dynamic panel estimation, to estimate the separate contributions of diminishing returns and technology transfer to the rate of conditional convergence. We find that both effects are important.
countries' distances from steady state and by the rate of decrease of returns to capital. Bernard and Jones (1996) , in commenting on the assumption of common technology growth, have called for further research on technology transfer as an explanation of convergence. There is a stream within the recent empirical literature that focuses on technology transfer as the force behind convergence, starting with Abramovitz (1986) , Baumol (1986) , and Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) ; see Fagerberg (1994) for a review and Coe and Helpman (1995) for specific evidence on international R&D spillovers. This approach starts from the assumption that technology levels and growth rates vary across countries. Poor countries face a large technology gap and, subject to their ability to absorb technology, may experience faster growth. Theories of endogenous technology, for example Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1998) , suggest a range of country specific factors, such as R&D policies and market structure, that influence long run technology growth. Endogenous growth models that incorporate international technology transfer (e.g. Howitt, 2000) suggest that growth rates in the short run depend on the dynamics of technological catch-up while, in the long run, growth rates are equalized across countries.
Despite the fundamental difference in assumptions between the classical convergence and technological catch-up models, the empirical estimating equations for both approaches are often similar in that both contain the log of initial GDP per capita. In the MRW approach this variable captures the distance a country is from its steady state. In the technology catch-up approach it is included to proxy the technology gap. Stokey (1994) and Temple (1999) have already noted this observational equivalence. Stokey goes on to comment: 'It would be interesting, and perhaps valuable for policy purposes, to know how much of the conditional convergence effect is due to technological catching-up. ' (p. 51) This is exactly the question that is addressed in this paper. Utilising capital stock data, rather than the investment data used by MRW, we are able to obtain a direct estimate of the output-capital elasticity and the implied rate of classical convergence. We can then interpret the coefficient on initial income as a measure of the rate of technological diffusion. This is similar to the modelling approach of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) -although this paper uses panel data and controls for unobserved country specific effects and for the endogeneity of factor accumulation.
The paper is structured as follows. The first task, as reported in Section 2, is to test the hypothesis of common technology in the Solow-Swan model. Islam (1995) has already rejected this hypothesis, but his test relies on the MRW specification of growth dynamics, a specification that we demonstrate to be flawed. Accordingly, we conduct an alternative test for a common rate of technology growth using a specification derived directly from the production function.
Having established that rates of technological progress do differ significantly across countries, Section 3 develops and estimates a model that allows us to test for both classical and technological convergence. We go on to investigate the role of human capital in facilitating technological transfer. Finding that both systematic catch-up and country-specific factors are important in explaining technological progress, we show that in the long-run both of these elements will explain differences in income levels as countries converge to the growth rates of the technological leader.
Testing for common technology
Our first objective is to test the proposition that technology is common across all countries. Islam (1995) and Lee et al. (1997) both reject this hypothesis using the MRW specification of the neo-classical growth dynamics. Since this specification is non-linear and over-determined, we develop an alternative that allows a straightforward test for heterogeneous technological progress.
We follow MRW in assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale
where Y is output, K is capital stock, L is labour input and A is the level of technology. Let the rate of growth of labour-augmenting technology equal g (i.e. A t ¼ A 0 e gt ) and the growth of labour equal n (i.e. L t ¼ L 0 e nt Þ: To derive the rate of growth of output per worker, we can express (1) in terms of output and capital per worker and differentiate with respect to time, yielding
where y ¼ Y=L and k ¼ K=L, and the dot notation denotes a time derivative. This expression, similar to that used in growth accounting exercises, allows direct econometric estimation of both the degree of diminishing returns to capital ð1 À Þ and the rate of technological progress, g-but it requires data on output, labour input, and net capital stocks. The Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) models make assumptions that allow the investment rate to be substituted for the rate of growth of the capital stock in eq. (2): a fixed rate of investment and a fixed rate of capital depreciation. The capital accumulation equation is given by
where s is the ratio of investment to output and is the rate of depreciation of the existing capital stock. This equation can be substituted into (2) to derive the proportional rate of growth of output per unit of effective labour (Y=AL ¼ )
MRW take a (log) linear approximation around the steady state, yielding l _ n n ffi ð þ g þ nÞð À 1Þ ln À ln * ½ ð 5Þ Equation (5) states that the rate of growth of output per unit of effective labour is approximately proportional to the deviation of output per effective labour unit from its steady state level, *. Since this expression is in unobservable units of effective labour, (5) must be transformed into output per worker and can also, for empirical work, be solved for a discrete time period. These steps lead to the following approximation for the growth of output per worker in country i over the period (0, )
Significantly, this equation leads to the inclusion of the log of initial GDP per worker, ln y i0 , as an explanatory variable. The coefficient on this variable is negative if the sum of depreciation, technology growth, and population growth is positive. This implies that the further a country is below its steady state the faster is its rate of economic growth. MRW estimate this expression using data on initial income, the period averages of growth in workers (n i ) and the ratio of investment to GDP (s i ). Importantly, they assume that depreciation (), technology growth (g), the capital coefficient () and initial technology levels (A 0 ) do not vary across countries, with and g summing to 0.05.
The regression is typically estimated as a linear function of a constant plus three right-hand side variables: ln y i0 , ln s i , and ln ð0:05 þ n i Þ. Testing that the coefficients on the latter two variables sum to zero is often regarded as a test of the restrictions implied by the Swan-Solow model. However, there are flaws with this procedure. Not only has the estimating equation been derived using an approximation, but MRW and subsequent authors make a further simplification by treating the term i as a constant-whereas it is clearly a function of the rate of growth of population, n i . In other words the 'linearised' model is not actually linear in its variables. Furthermore, we can see that the MRW specification is over-determined because there is only one independent parameter in the model: the capital elasticity, .
These mis-specifications are likely to bias tests of common technology. Accordingly, we also estimate the direct growth relationship (2) to provide an unbiased test of a common growth rate of technology. To do this, we take data on net capital stock per worker from the Penn World Table ( PWT 5.6a) as described in Summers and Heston (1991) and in notes to the updated tables. The capital stock per worker series provided in the PWT is calculated using the perpetual inventory method. A panel is constructed for the period 1965 to 1990, using five-year periods for each country as our unit of observation. There are 57 countries in the PWT 5.6a that have complete data on capital per worker from 1965 to 1990.
2 PWT 5.6a also provides data on the average investment share of GDP at constant international prices, the growth rate of the workforce, and the growth of real GDP per worker. A description of each variable is given in Appendix 1.
The panel specification based on eq. (2) can be written as
where i indexes countries, t indexes the time period, z it is the average annual growth of GDP per worker over the period, g i is the country specific rate of growth of technology, and " it is a random shock to technological growth. The regression coefficient provides a direct estimate of the output-capital elasticity. The equivalent panel estimation equation for the MRW model is derived from (6) as
The s it and n it are period averages and y 0 it denotes the productivity level at the beginning of the period.
We choose to estimate eq. (8) in this over-identified form to enable comparison with the results of MRW. Their assumptions imply three restrictions:
MRW test the first of these restrictions, Islam (1995) tests the first two, but the third non-linear restriction is typically ignored. MRW also specify an augmented-model including the contribution of human capital. This results in an additional term, the logarithm of the rate of investment in human capital, which they proxy by the school enrolment rate. Equally, we can augment the production function model by adding the rate of growth of educational capital as an explanatory variable, which we proxy with the rate of growth of the stock of schooling experience in the population.
3 Since neither of these vari- We have excluded Iran due to its reliance on oil production which is determined more by cartel and political considerations than by factor accumulation. 3 There is a continuing and important debate on measures of human capital, and their use in empirical growth analysis, which we do not focus on here (see Bils and Klenow, 2000; and Hanushek and Kimko, 2000 , for recent contributions).
ables adds to the explanatory power of their respective models, we report here the non-augmented versions. We return to consideration of educational capital in the next section. Table 1 summarises the results of estimating eq. (8) on our panel. We find that the country-specific fixed effects, the c i , are strongly significant. These fixed effects could represent heterogeneity in the growth rate of technology and/or in its initial level. Including these fixed effects, we do not reject the first restriction of the MRW model, 2 ¼ À 1 . The implied capital-output elasticity with fixed effects and the linear restriction is ¼ 0:47. MRW rejected this simple model because their crosssection estimate of was over 0.7, which they regarded as implausibly high. Including fixed effects with panel data provides a value more in line with observed capital income shares of around one third.
374 classical and technological convergence The dependent variable is the annual average growth rate of real GDP per worker over the five year period. Estimation is by OLS. The panel covers five time periods (1966-70 to 1986-90) and 57 countries.
Notes:
1. The linear restriction is 2 þ 1 ¼ 0.
2. The implied value of is 1 =ð 1 À Þ.
3. The p-statistics are the probability of type 2 error in rejecting the hypotheses that the education variable is significant, that the fixed effects ( 1 ) are identical, that the linear restriction holds, and that all the explanatory variables are exogenous (Hausman test), respectively.
4. Inclusion of the education variable requires dropping 6 countries.
The last two columns of Table 1 summarise the estimation of the production function model, (7). Here there is no problem of overidentification as we are using a direct measure of capital growth to estimate the output-capital elasticity. We again find that country-specific fixed effects are statistically significant at the 5% level-signifying different rates of technological progress. The capital coefficient is estimated to be 0.42.
Neither of the specifications is satisfactory, however, when we test for endogeneity of the regressors, using lagged values as instruments. To the extent that shocks to output growth are demand generated, we expect investment rates and capital accumulation to be positively correlated with the shock due to short-term accelerator effects. A positive correlation with supply side shocks is also to be expected if positive technology shocks raise the marginal product of capital, providing incentives for higher investment. Both arguments suggest that OLS is likely to overestimate the capital coefficient.
The Hausman test for endogeneity, reported in the final row of the table, confirms the endogeneity of the regressors in most of the specifications. Given this, in subsequent regression analysis instrumental variable estimation is always used. In addition, the subsequent analysis considers the problem of consistency in estimating a fixed effects model with a lagged dependent variable.
Technological catch-up and neo-classical convergence
The previous section established that the assumption of common technology is untenable in either specification of the neo-classical growth model. We proceed to examine the hypothesis that some part of the differences in technology growth may result from technological catch-up. The rate of growth of technology can be modeled as
where A Ã is the technology level of the lead country, A i is the technology level of the follower country (i), g i is a constant country-specific component of technical progress and g T represents the period-specific component. The assumption is that international transfer of technology raises the rate of technical progress in a follower country in direct proportion to the log of the technology gap at the beginning of the period. We do not model explicitly the country-specific determinants of the g i , but we expect them to be influenced by the institutions and policies that determine the domestic rate of innovation-as in Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1998) . Substitution of (10) into the exact production function eq. (7), substituting the ratio of real labour productivity for the unobservable technology ratio, and adding the rate of growth of educational capital, h, yields
The period-specific terms, defined in the first set of brackets, capture both common slowdowns (or speed-ups) in technical progress and the level of productivity in the lead country. We have not multiplied the technology terms by (1 À ) as in (7), so the definition of technology should now be interpreted as Hicks-neutral rather than labour-augmenting.
Estimation of a panel model that includes the log of initial GDP per worker as an explanatory variable is not straightforward. Given that the annual average growth rate ðz it ¼ ðln y T -ln y TÀ Þ=Þ is the dependent variable, the presence of ln y TÀ as a regressor means the model cannot be estimated consistently with OLS due to correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the fixed effects. Islam (1995) , Loayza (1994) , and Knight et al. (1993) , estimate a dynamic panel growth model using a Å-matrix method based on Chamberlin (1984) . This approach is, however, inconsistent unless all of the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous-a point made by Caselli et al. (1996) who use a GMM estimator which controls for the dynamic panel nature of the model and for endogeneity of the regressors. We follow their method 4 to estimate both the MRW specification and our technology-transfer augmented production function model. Results are summarised in Table 2 .
The first column of Table 2 reports GMM estimation of the augmented MRW model with the linear restriction imposed. Our results are similar to those reported by Caselli et al. (1996 , Table 3 ) as a basis for rejecting the MRW version of the Solow-Swan model. The implied structural parameters are problematic. An output elasticity for physical capital of 0.7 is too high and a statistically significant negative impact of schooling is unrealistic.
Columns 2 and 3 contain results from the GMM estimation of the technologytransfer augmented production function model. The difference between the two columns lies in the sets of instrumental variables used. In the first case, we use just the lagged right-hand side variables-including the lagged growth of capital. In the second case, the set of instruments is expanded to include lagged rates of investment in order to increase the predictive power of the instruments.
Of particular interest in columns two and three of Table 2 are the coefficients on the log of (initial) GDP per worker, corresponding to À in (11). To recap, this is included to capture technological catch-up and not to control for the distance from steady state as in the linearised MRW model. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant in both columns. The implication is that low productivity countries in our sample do benefit from technology transfer. Our preferred 4 The GMM method is explained in Caselli et al. (1996) and, more generally, in Baltagi (1995) or Doornik et al. (1999) . It is derived from Arellano and Bond (1991) . Essentially, the method involves using lagged variables as instruments, with efficiency gained by expanding the set of instruments over time (since later periods can use instruments from a larger set of previous time periods). 
Notes:
1. The results shown use the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator (second step results). This is implemented using the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) estimation routine in Ox, due to Doornik et al. (1999) . The DPD routine requires ln (y i;T ) as the dependent variable, hence coefficient estimates have been transformed to make them consistent with the annualised growth rate as the dependent variable. In all regressions the requirement of no serial correlation in " t was not rejected by tests. Similarly the Sargan test suggested the instruments are valid.
2. Columns 3 and 4 show estimates derived using lagged values of s k and s h as additional instrumental variables.
The implied value of
4. The neo-classical convergence parameter a is calculated as 0:06:ð1 À k À h Þ-representing the annual rate of convergence to steady state due to the concavity of the production function for a country where ð þ g þ nÞ ¼ 0:06.
The technology convergence parameter
tt is calculated as À½ln ð1 þ 5Þ=5-representing the annual rate of international convergence due to technology transfer.
estimates are those in column three where we have used the expanded set of instruments. The reported coefficient of À0.031 implies technological convergence, tt , of 3.4% per year. This implies that a country's technology level approaches the technology level of the leader country with a half-life of 20 years. As expected, the GMM estimation, controlling for endogeneity, yields a lower output elasticity for physical capital (0.19) and a very low, but positive, elasticity for educational capital. These elasticities imply an average rate of classical convergence of 4.8%. By this we mean that if the depreciation rate, population growth and technology growth happened to sum to the sample average of 0.06, 5 then the capital stock would reduce its distance from steady state by 4.8% each year, with a half-life of 14 years. In the previous section we followed the MRW assumptions that technology growth is around 2% per year, based on the observed per capita growth rate of all countries in the sample. But if some part of that growth is due to catch-up, a better estimate of exogenous technical progress is the rate of MFP growth in the US-a figure closer to 1% per year. We still follow the assumption of depreciation of 0.03 and population growth of 0.02 to calculate a typical rate of convergence.
classical and technological convergence
Taking these two factors together, technological convergence and capital convergence, suggest an aggregate conditional cross-country convergence rate of around 8% per year. This estimate is substantially higher than the original MRW estimate of 2% and Islam's (1995) estimates of around 5%. It is very similar to the preferred estimates of Caselli et al. (1996) , differing principally in that they attribute it entirely to classical convergence. Our estimate is, however, much lower than the 30% rate of convergence estimated by Lee et al. (1997) . This is because the latter study, using annual data and a univariate highly reduced form, allows no role for technological convergence, treating long-run growth rates as purely exogenous. Their very high convergence parameter, implying a half life of only two or three years, is probably best interpreted as the rate of reversion to trend growth rates in response to business cycle shocks.
It is important to emphasise that our estimates of rates of cross-country convergence are conditional on rates of investment and on the fixed effects and random shocks of the model. Whilst they might seem to suggest that the world's poorest countries are rapidly catching up on the world's richest economies, income and productivity levels have actually been diverging over the past four decades. For our sample of countries, the variance of the logarithm of real output per worker increased from 0.77 in 1970 to 0.91 in 1990. For a larger sample of 115 countries, the variance of log real GDP per capita increased over the same period from 0.92 to 1.22, and rose even further to 1.40 in 1997. 6 The observation that absolute convergence has not occurred across the world's economies, despite strong conditional convergence, is attributable in the first instance to the fact that poorer countries tend to have much lower rates of investment in both physical and educational capital.
Nevertheless, technological convergence does imply long-run convergence of growth rates across countries (as well as long-run intra-country convergence to Solow-Swan steady state capital intensity), despite the presence of significant country-specific growth terms in our growth eq. (11). For country i, technical progress has two components: the specific component g i and the endogenous component : ln ðy*=y i Þ where y*=y i is a proxy for the technology gap. A positive coefficient implies that in the very long-run all growth rates converge to a common rate. The country with the highest exogenous g i , say g max , will be the long-run technological leader with the highest level of output, y max . Equating long-run growth rates for the technological leader and country i yields: What is happening here is that the country with the highest exogenous growth rate eventually overtakes all other countries. Having been overtaken, other countries' growth rates are pulled up by technological spillover until all are growing at the same rate, maintaining constant ratios of productivity with respect to the leader. With our estimate of ¼ 0:031 (column 3 of Table 2 ), a country with annual exogenous technological progress say 0.01 below max, the long-run productivity ratio would be ðy i =y max Þ* ¼ 0:72: Column 4 in Table 2 augments the specification to test the hypothesis that the level of educational capital in the country influences the rate of technology transfer. This is done by adding an interaction term: the product of the technology gap and average years of secondary schooling in the population, h.
7 The positive coefficient on the interaction term implies that education does facilitate technology transfer.
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This result supports the findings of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Hansson and Henrekson (1994) .
An important issue to consider is the possibility that measurement error in the explanatory variables will bias the coefficients towards zero. This problem is exacerbated in panel estimation if explanatory variables are correlated over time. One method of assessing this issue is to use information from the PWT concerning data reliability. In the PWT each country is given a data quality grade, which is predominantly based on whether the country has participated in an international benchmark comparison. Given this, regressions were run on a sub-sample of 35 countries with relatively high data quality. 9 The regression results are shown in Table 3 , columns 1 and 2. They indicate that the broad results of Table 2 are robust. A related question is how the coefficients might vary if only the sub-sample of OECD countries is used. The results in column 3 of Table 3 show that the rate of technology convergence is much higher (10.6%) than that reported in column 1. Technological convergence within the OECD group of countries is three times as fast as that for the full (high quality data) sample. This supports Baumol's (1986) idea of 'convergence clubs' and, more generally, that a precondition of technological catch-up is that countries have similar levels of 'social capability' (Abramovitz, 1986) . Our control for levels of schooling does not appear to capture all the relevant aspects of social capability.
A referee has suggested that the initial productivity term in our regressions might be correlated with omitted variables, such as investment in R&D, causing a negative bias in the coefficient estimate. Whilst we can never totally discount omitted variable bias in any model, we note that if we were to analyse R&D investment in a The theoretical argument for this view can be traced to Nelson and Phelps (1966) ; a more recent discussion can be found in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 10) . Note that here the technology gap is defined as log of ratio of GDP per worker in USA to own country. 8 For example, if h equalled 1.3 (the mean of the sample), the effective coefficient on ln y 0 would be À0.0335 (a tt of 3.7% per year). A one standard deviation increase in h to 2.3 implies a of À0.0385 (a tt of 4.3%).
endogenous growth two sector model, such as Romer (1990) , with non-diminishing returns to knowledge in the knowledge creation sector, differences in the unobserved rates of R&D investment would be picked up by the currently unexplained country-specific effects in our empirical study. In turn, differences in R&D investment rates may be related to cross-country differences in market structures, tax rates or subsidy policies, property rights and other institutional factors (Varsakelis, 2001 ).
Conclusion
The MRW approximation to Swan-Solow growth dynamics is non-linear, overidentified, and fails to distinguish between the effects of diminishing returns and technology transfer. An alternative specification, using capital stock data, allows us to identify these two sources of convergence. Preliminary results, using static panel estimation methods, show strong rejection of the assumption of common exogenous technology for all countries. Consistent estimation of the technology-transfer, production-function model requires dynamic panel techniques (GMM) to deal with the problems of a lagged dependent variable and endogeneity of capital accumulation.
GMM estimation confirms that 'classical convergence', due to diminishing returns, is important. Countries converge towards steady state levels of capital at a rate close to 5% a year, implying that the distance from steady state is halved every 14 years. The Solow-Swan 'steady state' is, however, a moving target which grows at different rates in each country. Part of the pattern of heterogeneous growth is international technology transfer, which is enhanced by high levels of education. The average rate of technological catch-up is around three and a half percentage points per year.
The models we estimate contain unexplained country-specific differences in technical progress, which may well reflect unobserved policy and institutional differences. Technology transfer implies that these country-specific rates of innovation influence long-run levels of productivity, with long-run growth ultimately determined by the growth rate of the technology leader.
There is a sad irony in the observation that the increasing sophistication of economic and econometric modeling over the past decade has led to substantial upward revisions in our estimates of the rate of conditional convergence, whilst the hard fact remains that the poorest economies in the world have been falling further behind the richest over most of the past half century. The fact that cross-country income convergence has not occurred within the time-frame of our study is attributable to lower rates of investment in both physical and education capital in the poorer countries. Our findings suggest that poor countries with a low capacity to save and invest are doubly disadvantaged, losing out not only in terms of factor accumulation but also in building the educational capability that would facilitate technological catch-up.
steve dowrick and mark rogers 381 Table 5 .6a that have capital stock data. Growth rate is real GDP per worker. 'Data quality grade' is from PWT appendices.
Table A2
Variable Description y Real GDP per worker (PWT 5.6) s Log of real investment as a fraction of GDP (averaged over previous 5 year period) (PWT 5.6) n Growth of workforce (previous 5 years) (PWT 5.6) k real net capital stock per worker (PWT 5.6) s h Secondary school enrolment rate (Barro and Lee, 1996) h Average years of secondary schooling in population (Barro and Lee, 1996) Sources: Penn World Tables from http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu
Barro and Lee data from http://www.nber.org/data/
